Abstract: Imbalances in supply and demand often cause the price for the same good to vary across geographic locations. Economic theory suggests that if the price differential is greater than the cost of transporting the good between locations, then buyers will shift demand from high-price locations to lowprice locations, while sellers will shift supply from low-price locations to high-price locations. This should make prices more uniform and cause the overall market to adhere more closely to the "law of one price." However, this assumes that traders have the information necessary to shift their supply/demand in an optimal way. We investigate this using data on over 2 million transactions in the wholesale used vehicle market from 2003 to 2008. This market has traditionally consisted of a set of non-integrated regional markets centered on market facilities located throughout the United States. Supply / demand imbalances and frictions associated with trading across distance created significant geographic price variance for generally equivalent vehicles. During our sample period, the percentage of transactions conducted electronically in this market rose from approximately 0% to approximately 20%. We argue that the electronic channel reduces buyers' information search costs and show that buyers are more sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance when purchasing via the electronic channel than via the traditional physical channel. This causes buyers to be more likely to shift demand away from a nearby facility where prices are high to a more remote facility where prices are low. We show that these "cross-facility" demand shifts have led to a 25% reduction in geographic price variance during the time frame of our sample. We also show that sellers are reacting to these market shifts by becoming less strategic about vehicle distribution, given that vehicles are increasingly likely to fetch a similar price regardless of where they are sold.
Introduction
Supply and demand forces often cause the price for the same good to vary across geographic locations. Economic theory suggests that if the price differential is greater than the cost of transporting the good between locations, then buyers will shift demand from high-price locations to low-price locations, while sellers will shift supply from low-price locations to high-price locations. These shifts should lead to a market in which price of a good does not differ between any two locations by more than the cost of transport between them. In other words, the market should obey the "law of one price." However, this expectation is based on the assumption that traders have the information necessary to shift their supply/demand in an optimal way. If this information is costly to acquire, then there is no reason to expect markets to obey the "law of one price." As such, information search costs have been offered as an explanation for the repeated violation of the "law of one price" in many markets (see Baye et al., 2006 for a review). In his seminal paper on this topic, Stigler (1961) noted that the cost of searching for and acting upon market information will increase with the geographic size and dispersion of the market. This leads to imbalances in supply and demand across locations, creating geographic segmentation within markets.
Because electronic commerce reduces search costs by making information available at the click of a mouse (Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000) , electronic channels have the potential to break down many of the geographic barriers that have traditionally segmented markets. The elimination of these barriers can have dramatic effects for buyer and seller behavior and for overall market efficiency. For example, electronic commerce lowers buyer search costs (Bakos, 1997) , which makes it easier for buyers to collect price information from regions outside their local geographies. If buyers discover that prices are lower in a geographic region outside their own, then they can use electronic channels to shift their purchasing to the lower-price region. This shifting of demand should cause prices across regions to become less variable, thereby more closely reflecting the "law of one price." As prices become more uniform, sellers should become less strategic about how they distribute products across locations, because products will fetch a similar price regardless of where they are sold.
We use the United States wholesale used vehicle market as the context in which to study whether and how buyers use electronic channels to shift their demand geographically, the effect this has on geographic price variance, and how sellers respond to these changes in the market. This market is well-suited to our analysis for several reasons. First, the wholesale used vehicle market has traditionally consisted of a set of non-integrated regional markets centered on market facilities located throughout the U.S. at which transactions were conducted based on physical collocation of buyers, sellers, and vehicles. This geographic segmentation and the associated imbalances in supply and demand caused prices for generally equivalent vehicles to vary across locations by more than the cost of transport. Second, the percentage of trades conducted electronically rose steadily over our sample period, growing from approximately 0% in 2003 to approximately 20% by mid-2008 . This evolution permits a longitudinal analysis of whether and how the increase in electronic trading affected buyer behavior, seller behavior, and the variance of prices across market locations. An interesting feature of the empirical context is that the electronic channel is specific to buyers. Sellers do not use the electronic channel, although buyers' use of the channel may prompt behavioral changes by the sellers. This feature permits us to investigate how the electronic channel has affected demand and how supply has adjusted. Third, the wholesale used vehicle market is representative of other geographically segmented markets such as those for agricultural crops, livestock, seafood, fuels, building materials, and heavy machinery (e.g., Aker, 2010; Diekmann et al., 2008; Jensen, 2007) . Our findings about whether and how electronic trading has affected trader behavior and market efficiency in the wholesale used vehicle market should help us understand similar phenomena in other markets.
We have detailed transaction data for over 2 million vehicles sold in the market from 2003 to 2008.
Among other variables, we observe the transaction price, the make/model of each vehicle, the location of each vehicle (there are over 80 market locations across the U.S. at which vehicles are sold), the location of each buyer based on his zip code, and whether the buyer purchased the vehicle via the traditional physical channel or via the electronic channel. We pose four research questions. First, do buyers use the electronic channel to extend their purchasing reach to more remote locations? We find that they do;
buyers are approximately 29% less sensitive to distance when purchasing via the electronic channel than via the physical channel. Second, do buyers use the reach of the electronic channel to shift their demand to other locations to take advantage of lower prices? We find that they do; buyers are approximately 194% more sensitive to price when purchasing via the electronic channel than via the physical channel.
Third, are these demand shifts associated with reduced price variance across locations? We find that they are; a one standard deviation increase in the number of vehicles of a given model (e.g., Ford Ranger, Toyota Camry) that buyers purchase from remote locations is associated with a 13% decrease in price variance for vehicles of that model across the U.S. Fourth, how do sellers react to the reduction in geographic price variance in the market? Sellers choose the location at which to sell vehicles, and we find that sellers placed less weight on recent prices at a location when making distribution decisions as electronic trading increased. We conclude that this is because distributing vehicles to locations where prices have recently been high becomes less valuable as buyers become increasingly likely to use the electronic channel to shift demand out of those locations.
The study draws upon and contributes to two main research streams. The first, second, and fourth research questions relate primarily to the research stream on how electronic commerce affects geographic trade (e.g., Blum & Goldfarb, 2006; Hortacsu et al., 2009) . The third research question relates primarily to the research stream on how electronic commerce affects price dispersion 1 (e.g., Chellappa et al., 2011; Clay et al., 2002; Clemons et al., 2002) . The second and third research questions create the linkage between these two research streams by asking how the shifting of demand across geographic locations facilitated by electronic commerce affects price variance across those locations.
We contribute to both research streams in several ways. First, prior empirical studies have examined whether reduced buyer search costs in electronic channels lead to lower price dispersion (e.g., Brown & Goolsbee, 2002) . Although many of these studies have demonstrated significant changes in price dispersion, they typically have not examined the micro-level buyer behavior that leads to that outcome.
We use a discrete choice model using individual buyer transactions across both physical and electronic channels to examine the behavioral mechanism by which reduced buyer search costs lead to lower price dispersion. 2 Our results show that buyers are more sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance when using the electronic channel compared to the physical channel. As a result, they shift purchases from nearby locations where prices are relatively high to remote locations where prices are relatively low.
These cross-location demand shifts --which have become more common over time --represent the mechanism through which changes in buyer behavior have led to lower price dispersion across geographic locations. Observing this mechanism is critical for continued empirical research about electronic channels and price dispersion because different assumptions about the mechanism can result in more or less price dispersion when modeled analytically (Baye et al., 2006) . We build upon the results of the choice model by using fixed effects panel regression to attempt to quantify the relationship between cross-location demand shifts and geographic price dispersion.
Second, existing empirical research on how electronic channels influence price dispersion has generally ignored the geographic location of products as a factor in influencing their price and therefore their price dispersion. This is because location has been irrelevant for the types of products that have typically been studied (e.g., books, consumer electronics, and tickets), because the cost of shipping the product to the buyer --which is a component of the overall price paid by the buyer --is the same regardless of the product's location. However, shipping costs vary significantly with location for products such as automobiles, agricultural commodities, fuels, and metals, the dollar value of trade for which is substantially larger than that for goods more commonly studied. 3 For these products, the distance between buyers and products influences the prices that buyers pay, which in turn affects the dispersion of prices 1 We use the terms "price variance" and "price dispersion" interchangeably.
2 For examples of how reductions in seller search costs influence price dispersion in the context of commodity food markets in developing countries, see Aker (2010) and Jensen (2007 for those products at different locations. We examine the location of products and buyers and find that the distance between them influences when buyers use physical vs. electronic channels and weakens the relationship between cross-location demand shifts and price dispersion.
Third, most of the existing research on price dispersion has studied fixed price environments by analyzing prices posted by sellers. By contrast, we study an environment in which prices are determined by auction. This allows us to observe the actual transacted prices in the market, rather than just the posted prices, which is unusual in this stream (but see Ghose and Yao (2011) for a recent exception).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical context and data. Section 3 discusses how the steady increase in electronic trading between 2003 and 2008 might have influenced buyer/seller behavior and geographic price variance. Section 4 presents our empirical models and analysis. Section 5 summarizes the results, limitations, and contributions of the study.
Empirical Context
The empirical context of the study is the wholesale used vehicle market. This is a business-tobusiness market in which buyers and sellers trade used vehicles. The buyers are used car dealers who purchase vehicles in the wholesale market for resale to retail customers. dealer to sell in the wholesale market is if he does not wish to (or cannot) sell a vehicle in the retail market. In this case, he will sell the vehicle wholesale to another dealer who will retail the vehicle.
Institutional sellers sell in the wholesale market because they often lack retail operations and because the wholesale market is a highly liquid environment for selling multiple vehicles. Approximately 9 million vehicles are exchanged in the market each year (Source: National Auto Auction Association (www.naaa.com.))
There are several intermediaries that provide services in the market, including aggregating buyers and sellers, providing storage while vehicles are pending sale (referred to as "marshalling"), and providing transaction assurance. The intermediaries also operate physical market facilities at which transactions are conducted. Market facilities are located throughout the U.S. as well as the world, although our analysis is specific to the U.S. Sellers transport vehicles to market facilities where buyers purchase them via an auction process. Each vehicle that is auctioned is driven -one at a time -into a warehouse-type building into the midst of a group of buyers. A human auctioneer solicits bids from the buyers in an ascending, open outcry format, i.e., a traditional English auction. Once the auctioneer can solicit no additional bids, the seller indicates to the auctioneer whether he will accept the high bid. The vehicle is then driven away, and the next vehicle is driven into place and the process repeats. It is common for vehicles of the same model j (e.g., Toyota Camry) to be auctioned one after another. It is also common for auctions to be conducted at multiple facilities concurrently. After purchasing a vehicle, the buyer is responsible for transporting the vehicle to his dealership. The cost of transportation is non-trivial and increases with distance.
2.1 The Electronic "Webcast" Channel: The physical process described above remains the predominant method by which vehicles are exchanged in the wholesale market in the United States.
However, an increasing percentage of transactions are conducted electronically. The most popular electronic channel is the webcast channel. The webcast channel consists of an Internet browser-based application that streams live audio and video of the physical auctions. Buyers can use the application to place bids on vehicles in competition with the buyers who are physically present at the facility. This has given buyers a choice for how to participate in the bidding for a vehicle: they can either participate physically in the traditional fashion or electronically using the webcast channel.
It is worth highlighting two points about the webcast channel. First, the webcast channel does not affect the price discovery mechanism. The auctioneer solicits bids for each vehicle in an ascending fashion; this price discovery process is not affected by the channel buyers use to place bids. Second, the webcast channel is specific to buyers; sellers do not use it. Sellers present their vehicles in the same fashion --having them driven through the physical market facility --regardless of whether buyers are using the physical or the electronic "webcast" channels to place bids. The low mileage of vehicles in the sample also increases the likelihood that vehicles are of predictable 4 The webcast channel is not the only method by which buyers can purchase vehicles electronically. There are also stand-alone electronic markets that operate in the industry. The key distinction between the two is that the webcast channel augments the physical market, while the electronic markets are separate from it. We limit our analysis to the webcast channel for two reasons. First, the vast majority of electronic transactions are conducted via the webcast channel. In our data, webcast transactions outnumber the other electronic transactions over 8 to 1. Second, the standalone electronic markets typically offer a fixed price option to buyers, and there is no human auctioneer to solicit bids. This creates differences in the price discovery mechanism that could confound our results. For simplicity, all references to the electronic channel are specific to the webcast channel.
quality, such that they may be traded effectively via either the physical or electronic channels (Overby & Jap, 2009 between facilities and between buyers and facilities. we assigned him to that facility. If a buyer had more than one facility within this radius, we calculated the facility from which he made the most physical purchases and assigned him to that facility. We assigned buyers who were located farther than 125 miles from the nearest facility to the facility closest to them.
This procedure yields the same assignments as a procedure in which each buyer is assigned to the closest facility, with the exception of those buyers who are close to multiple facilities. We used this procedure so that buyers were assigned to nearby facilities that they actually visited, rather than to whichever facility was simply the closest.
Geographic Price Variance and Buyer/Seller Behavior
3.1 Geographic Price Variance: We first present some summary statistics. We calculated the average price of vehicles of each make/model (e.g., Toyota Camry, Ford Escape) at each facility in each quarteryear. We then calculated the variation in those average prices across facilities (using the coefficient of variation) in each quarter-year. We label this CV jt , where j indexes the make/model and t indexes the quarter-year. For example, assume that the average price for Toyota Camry's in Q1 2003 was $12,000 at the Charlotte facility, $14,000 at the Orlando facility, and $10,000 at the Nashville facility. In this case, CV jt = (2,000 / 12,000) = 0.16. We then averaged CV jt across all make/models j in each quarter-year to get a measure of the overall variance of prices in the market. We plotted this statistic for each quarter-year.
This is shown in Figure 1 , along with the percentage of electronic transactions. Geographic price dispersion declines as electronic transaction activity increases. The main goal of our analysis is to study this relationship.
Figure 1: Proportion of electronic transactions and coefficient of variation of prices across facilities per quarter-year.
A key reason why geographic price variance exists in the market is imbalances in supply and demand across facilities. The supply at a facility is determined by the number of vehicles being auctioned at the facility. The demand at a facility is determined by the number of buyers purchasing at the facility. We posit that sellers react to how buyers are using the electronic channel by placing less weight on recent prices at a facility when making distribution decisions. This is because distributing vehicles to facilities where prices have recently been high becomes less valuable as buyers become increasingly likely to shift demand out of those facilities. Thus, we posit that buyers are using the electronic channel in a way that reduces geographic price variance and that sellers are reacting to buyer behavior in a rational manner. 
Models and Results
In this section, we investigate potential changes to buyer and seller behavior attributable to the electronic channel. We also consider whether these changes might explain the reduction in geographic price variance illustrated in Figure 1 .
4.1 Buyer Behavior: As noted in Section 3, the relevant buyer behavior for our analysis is how buyers choose the facilities at which to purchase vehicles. We hypothesize that buyers will make different choices depending on whether they are using the physical or electronic channel (which is itself a choice), with buyers' facility choices less affected by distance but more affected by price when using the electronic channel. We developed a discrete choice model to investigate this. We assume that a buyer is purchasing a vehicle(s) of a particular make/model j (e.g., Ford Taurus) on day t. He can purchase that vehicle at any facility at which vehicles of make/model j are auctioned on day t. Each facility provides differential utility to the buyer based on prices at the facility, the distance to the facility, the supply of vehicles available at the facility, and the condition of the vehicles available at the facility. We measured price (NormPrice jkt ) as the average normalized price (normalized price = price / valuation; see Table 1) 5 It is possible to model this formally via a sequential game in which a seller moves first by choosing a facility at which to auction a vehicle. The two main considerations for the seller are the distance to the facility (due to transportation costs) and historical prices at the facility (to try to exploit geographic price variance by selling where demand is most likely to be high). A buyer moves second and is of one of two types: he either uses the webcast channel or he does not. If the buyer uses the webcast channel, then he has the option to bid at his "local" facility or to shift his bid to a remote facility, which he will do if the price difference between facilities is sufficiently high. Let μ denote the probability that the buyer uses the webcast channel. As μ increases, it becomes more likely that a given buyer will shift his bid away from his local facility if prices there are high. This demand-shifting thwarts (to some extent) the seller's attempt to achieve above average prices; recognizing this, she will place less weight on historical prices (and more on other factors) when making distribution decisions as μ increases. ConditionGrade g for those vehicles based on: a) the average condition grade for vehicles of the same model j sold at the same facility k over the prior 21 days, b) the vehicle's mileage, and c) the vehicle's age. Specifically, we regressed ConditionGrade g (when observed) on these three variables and used the resulting coefficients to impute ConditionGrade g when not observed. We also included alternativespecific constants in the choice model to capture the latent utility of each facility. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for these and other variables described later in this section. Proportion of buyer i's 10 (or fewer if necessary) purchases prior to day t made via the webcast channel.
0.08 (0.22) 6 We also included in the model the average normalized price for vehicles of model j sold at facility k for the 21 days prior to day t (RecentNormPrice jkt ) to account for the possibility that buyers consider recent historical prices at a facility when making decisions. This variable was not significant at the 10% level.
7 Price (and other variables) is commonly imputed in choice models, because the price of non-chosen alternatives in a choice set is often unobserved. This often results in choice models in which price is imputed [(n-1)/n]*100 percent of the time, where n is the number of alternatives (e.g., see Bucklin et al., 2008, p. 480; Chiou, 2009, p. 292) . Our level of imputation is much less because we usually observe average prices of non-chosen alternatives.
The complete buyer choice set is quite large, as is the number of parameters given the inclusion of the alternative-specific constants for each facility. This size makes model estimation unstable and convergence difficult, particularly for choice model formulations other than the conditional logit. To achieve an estimable model, we took a geographic subset of the sample by analyzing only the purchases made by buyers local to the facilities in the western U.S., which consists of the facilities in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. We also limited the choice set to facilities within this region. We estimated the model using this sub-sample for two reasons. First, it is large enough geographically to allow us to examine whether buyers' sensitivity to distance is affected by the electronic channel. Second, 93.7% of purchases by buyers local to facilities within this region are from facilities within this region, which allows us to consider it a microcosm of the entire market. The filtered choice data set consists of 313,252 choices and 18 facilities.
As a first step in our analysis, we divided the sample into observations in which the buyer purchased via the physical channel and those in which the buyer purchased via the electronic channel. We then estimated conditional logit models for the two sub-samples. This provides estimates of how each variable influences buyers' location choices, conditional on the buyer having already chosen a channel. Results appear in Table 3 . As a next step, we included the channel choice in the specification by using a nested logit model, which essentially allows us to estimate the two sub-samples shown in Table 3 simultaneously. The nests represent the buyer's option to purchase from a facility using either the physical or electronic channels.
This allows us to model the buyer's choice of facility and channel, although our focus remains on how buyers choose a facility conditional on having chosen a channel. The nesting structure is illustrated in In the nested logit specification, each facility appears twice in a buyer's choice set: once in the physical channel nest and once in the electronic channel nest. For example, assume that vehicles of make/model j are being auctioned in Charlotte and New Orleans on day t. Because buyer i can purchase using either the physical or electronic channels, he has four alternatives for purchasing this vehicle:
physically in Charlotte, physically in New Orleans, electronically in Charlotte, and electronically in New
Orleans. This means that a change in a variable such as NormPrice jkt affects both the physical and electronic alternatives for facility k in a choice set. A feature of the nested logit is that it increases the probability that buyers substitute within nests (i.e., channels in our case) rather than across nests (Train, 2009 ). In our case, the nested logit increases the probability that a change in a variable such as an increase
in NormPrice jkt will cause a buyer to buy from a different facility using his preferred channel (i.e., to substitute within nests) rather than to buy from the same facility using the other channel (i.e., to substitute across nests.)
We included in the buyer's utility function a dummy variable for alternatives in the electronic nest (Electronic c ) and interacted that with the price, distance, supply, and condition variables to capture how their explanatory power differ across channels. To capture dynamics in buyers' use of the electronic channel vis-à-vis the physical channel, we constructed Electronic_Propensity it , which is the proportion of buyer i's 10 (or fewer if necessary) purchases prior to day t made via the electronic channel. It measures the strength of buyer i's preference for the electronic channel. We interacted Electronic_Propensity it with Electronic c . This allows the latent utility of the electronic channel to change as a buyer i uses it more (or less). To summarize, we modeled the utility of each alternative (which consists of a channel c / facility k combination) for buyer i purchasing a vehicle(s) of model j on day t as: The coefficient for Electronic c (β 10 = -13.872) is negative and significant. This indicates that purchasing via the electronic channel generates substantial disutility. However, the positive and This indicates that the disutility of distance is 29% less when purchasing via the electronic channel. The combined coefficient (β 2 + β 6 = -0.005) is negative and significant. This indicates that buyers still prefer nearby facilities when using the electronic channel, but less so than when using the physical channel.
We summarize these results as follows. A buyer is more likely to be in the electronic "nest" (i.e., to choose the electronic channel) as his experience with the electronic channel grows. When in the electronic "nest", a buyer is less sensitive to distance when choosing a facility, because he doesn't have to travel to the facility if he is using the electronic channel. When in the electronic "nest", a buyer is more sensitive to price when choosing a facility, because the electronic channel provides him with better information about average prices across facilities. Put together, these results indicate that buyers are more likely to shift their demand from nearby facilities where prices are high to more distant facilities where prices are low as their use of the electronic channel increases.
4.2 Seller Behavior: As noted in Section 3, the relevant seller behavior for our analysis is how sellers choose the facilities at which to sell vehicles. Although sellers do not use the electronic channel, we posit that buyers' use of the channel will influence sellers' distribution choices. We examine this via a discrete choice model.
Each auctioned vehicle represents a choice made by the seller to sell that vehicle at a given facility rather than alternative facilities. Each facility provides differential utility to the seller based on factors such as recent prices at the facility, the recent supply of similar vehicles, and the historical propensity of the seller to sell vehicles at the facility. Specifically, we model the utility of facility k for seller s selling a vehicle of make/model j at time t as: 
RecentNormPrice jkt is the average normalized price (normalized price = price / valuation; see Table 1) for vehicles of model j sold at facility k in the 3 weeks prior to week t. This accounts for the (dis)utility of recent (low) high prices at a facility. PctBuyerElectronic kt is the percentage of purchases by buyers assigned to facility k that were made in the electronic channel in week t. This influences the utility of facility k for a seller because it represents whether buyers local to facility k are a "captive" buying group Facility(k) are dummy variables for each facility and serve as alternative-specific constants in the model. Another variable that affects the seller's utility is the distance between a vehicle's location prior to entering the market and each facility k. We cannot include this variable in the model because the vehicle's location prior to entering the market is unobserved. However, we believe that some of this effect is captured in DistributionPropensity jkst . This is because one of the reasons that a seller is likely to have a high (low) propensity to sell vehicles at a facility is because the facility is close (far) to the vehicle. Percentage of purchases by buyers assigned to facility k that were made in the electronic channel in week t. Number of vehicles of model j sold by any seller at facility k in the 3 weeks prior to day t.
(16.75)
We estimated the model using a conditional logit specification. Results appear in Table 6 . The coefficient for RecentNormPrice c (β 1 = 0.110) is positive and significant, and the coefficient for RecentNormPrice jkt *PctBuyerElectronic kt (β 3 = -1.093) is negative and significant. This shows that recent prices provide positive utility to sellers when making distribution decisions but that this utility becomes weaker with increased use of the electronic channel by the buyers local to that facility. This suggests that the demand shifting enabled by the electronic channel is causing sellers to become less strategic about vehicle distribution, which is as expected based on the logic outlined in Section 3. Further evidence of this is provided by the coefficients for DistributionPropensity jkst and DistributionPropensity jkst *PctBuyerElectronic kt (β 5 and β 6 ), which are both positive and significant. This indicates that sellers tend to sell vehicles where they have sold them in the past (which is likely due to geographic proximity, at least in part), and they have become even more likely to do so as electronic trading has increased.
In addition to the separate estimation of supply and demand just presented, we also investigated simultaneous estimation. See Appendix B for details. become less pronounced as use of the electronic channel has grown. Essentially, sellers are becoming less strategic about vehicle distribution as electronic channel use has grown, because any pricing inefficiencies that a seller might otherwise exploit are increasingly likely to be eliminated once the auctions start by buyers using the electronic channel.
The change in buyer behavior should lower geographic price variance by better matching demand to the available supply across facilities. On the other hand, the change in seller behavior should not lower geographic price variance. If anything, it might increase geographic price variance, because sellers are less likely to shift supply to match expected demand. Thus, any relationship we find between changes in buyer behavior and geographic price variance should be in the correct direction but may be conservative.
To examine (and attempt to quantify) how the change in buyer behavior due to the electronic channel has lowered geographic price variance, we focused on the specific mechanism through which this should occur: what we refer to a "cross-facility purchase." We define this as a purchase in which a buyer local to facility A purchased from facility B. Figure 5 shows that most purchases made via the electronic channel are "cross-facility" and that the total number of cross-facility purchases increased over time. This increase is attributable to increased use of the electronic channel over time. 
es k that SameFacilityPurchases jklt measures purchases made by buyers local to facility k (facility l) at facility k (facility l.) The sum of CrossFacilityPurchases jklt and SameFacilityPurchases jklt is the total number of purchases of vehicles of model j made by the buyers local to either of the facilities in the pair at either of the facilities in the pair. Thus, including SameFacilityPurchases jklt allows us to control for this overall volume. Distance kl is the distance in miles between facilities k and l, which we scaled by dividing by 1,000. We interacted Distance kl with CrossFacilityPurchases jklt and SameFacilityPurchases jklt . Because
Distance kl does not vary over time, we could not include it as a main effect. Table 7 . Distance kl Average distance in miles between facilities k and l, divided by 1000. 1.058 (0.635) 0.671 (0.503) Column A: All facility pairs; Column B: Only facility pairs for which there was cross-facility purchasing. a CrossFacilityTrans jklt measures the purchases by buyers local to facility k at one other facility l (and vice versa.) When purchases by buyers local to facility k at all other facilities are calculated, the volume of cross-facility purchasing is roughly equal to that of same-facility purchasing, as shown in Table 9 .
Results of specification 2 appear in column A of Table 8 . There were 621,141 facility pairs in the panel. There was no cross-facility purchasing for 532,360 of these facility pairs. Column B shows the results after excluding these facility pairs; this allowed us to develop estimates for facility pairs with active cross-facility purchasing. Table 8 shows that cross-facility purchases have a negative relationship with price variance, as expected. Of interest is that both same-facility and cross-facility purchases negatively influence price variance, but the effect of cross-facility purchases is stronger; β 1 and β 3 are statistically different (p < 0.01.) We attribute this to the following. Any transaction increases trading volume, which reduces price variance because it increases the amount of price information in the market. However, a cross-facility purchase has a particularly strong effect because buyers purchase across facilities partly to exploit price discrepancies, which accentuates the reduction in geographic price variance. The coefficient for the interaction between CrossFacilityTrans jklt and Distance kl (β 2 ) is positive and significant, showing that the effect of cross-facility transactions weakens with distance. We believe that this is because although the electronic channel reduces some of the frictions associated with distant trade, buyers must still ship vehicles back to their locations. Thus, especially long-distance trades are less likely to be motivated by price considerations and should therefore have a smaller effect on geographic price variance. The average distance between buyer and facility for electronic transactions is 251 miles. Setting this as the distance and using the estimates from column B of Table 8 , an additional cross-facility purchase by the buyers local to a facility pair decreases the coefficient of variation of an average vehicle model by 0.0014. The mean of CVPrice jklt for facility pairs with cross-facility purchasing is 0.11. This indicates that each additional cross-facility purchase for a facility pair separated by 251 miles is associated with a 1.3% decrease in the coefficient of variation of prices between the facility pair.
There is a risk of reverse causality in the panel regression because low price variance between facilities might lead to few cross-facility transactions. However, if this were the direction of the effect, then there would be a positive relationship between CVPrice jklt and CrossFacilityPurchasesTrans jklt , which would make it more difficult to recover the negative relationship shown in Table 8 . In addition, the results of the buyer choice model provide a clear mechanism through which causality flows from crossfacility purchasing to price variance. Nevertheless, for robustness against this potential endogeneity concern, we instrumented CrossFacilityPurchases jklt with CrossFacilityPurchases jkl,t-1 , i.e., the first lag.
The first lag is a useful instrument when the endogeneity concern stems from reverse causality because it is not contemporaneous to the dependent variable. In the first stage regression, CrossFacilityPurchases jkl,t-1 is positively correlated with CrossFacilityPurchases jklt (β = 1.07, std. error = 0.04). After instrumentation, the β 1 and β 2 coefficients in column B of Table 8 become -0.0060 (s.e. = 0.0005) and 0.0061 (s. e. = 0.0007), respectively, which suggests that the results shown in Table 8 are in the correct direction but potentially conservative in magnitude.
As an additional test, we created a panel containing the total number of cross-facility purchases (CrossFacilityPurchases jt ), the total number of same-facility purchases (SameFacilityPurchases jt ), and the coefficient of variation of price (CVPrice jt ) for vehicles of model j in each time period t across all facilities in the U.S. (instead of between discrete facility pairs as above.) Table 9 We estimated specification 4 using time dummies and fixed effects for vehicle models. Table 10 shows the results. β 1 is negative and significant. A one standard deviation increase in CrossFacilityTrans jt is associated with a 13% decrease in CVPrice jt . For reasons similar to those discussed above, we
instrumented CrossFacilityTrans jt with the first lag. In the first stage regression, CrossFacilityTrans j,t-1 is positively correlated with CrossFacilityTrans jt (β = 0.08, std. error = 0.03). After instrumentation, β 1 becomes -0.0004 (std. error = 0.0001). This suggests that β 1 is in the correct direction but conservative. The results shown in Table 10 show that prices across the U.S. are becoming more uniform or what we call "flatter", while the results shown in Table 8 show that the flattening effect of electronic trading weakens with distance. This presents a paradox: how can prices across the entire country be flattening when the flattening effect operates primarily on a regional basis?
We offer two possible explanations. First, regional price flattening eliminates extremely high and low prices from the market, which will lower price variance for the country as a whole. Second, it is possible Chevrolet Malibu at facility B on more dimensions than just location. Even if the two vehicles were identical when first manufactured (e.g., same color, same option packages), they are no longer identical after having been driven 15,000 miles. We address this by including multiple controls for vehicle quality, including normalizing price by valuation and including vehicle condition data. In our analysis of the change in geographic price variance, we cannot determine how much of the change we observe is due to increased cross-facility purchasing and how much is due to heterogeneity within vehicle models.
However, we have no reason to believe that the heterogeneity within vehicle models changed significantly over the time span covered by our data, but we know that cross-facility purchasing increased during this time. Thus, we believe that the reduction in price variance we observe is attributable to demand shifts facilitated by the electronic channel, and that this holds despite noise due to vehicle heterogeneity.
6.2: Intended Contributions: Our study links two research streams: 1) how electronic commerce affects price dispersion, and b) how electronic commerce affects geographic trade. The price dispersion stream has not considered the geographic location of products, despite the fact that it plays an important role in the trade of many products such as automobiles, food products, and raw materials. The geographic trade stream has not considered whether or how electronic commerce leads to lower price dispersion across locations. In joining these two streams, we make the following contributions. First, we document the behavioral mechanism by which electronic trading affects price dispersion, which is critical for continued empirical research in this stream (Baye et al. 2006) . Specifically, our results show that buyers are more sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance when using the electronic channel than when using the physical channel. This increases the likelihood that buyers will eschew purchasing at a nearby facility to purchase at a remote facility where prices are lower. These cross-facility purchases are the mechanism that has led to lower price variance between facilities. Second, we show that the location of products and buyers plays an important role in buyer behavior and price dispersion. The distance between products and buyers influences how buyers choose the facility and channel from which to purchase and moderates the relationship between cross-facility trading and price dispersion. 
To show the proof, we manipulate this expression assuming pr a > pr b . The proof is analogous for pr b > pr a . For pr a > pr b , we can remove the absolute value operator from the left-hand side of (1) This appendix discusses the possibility of simultaneous estimation of supply and demand in our context. As background, consider that the most common simultaneous models of supply and demand in a non-linear discrete choice framework are based on the work of industrial economists such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (Berry et al., 1995; Berry, 1994) . These models assume that sellers set prices based on an equilibrium pricing rule specified by the econometrician (see Train, 2009 : chapter 13 for a thorough discussion.) For example, the econometrician might assume that the seller sets prices based on marginal cost or that the seller chooses a profit-maximizing price in an oligopoly setting, etc. These models do not apply in our context because sellers do not set prices in our context; prices are determined by auction. Also, it is not clear how a new method that is appropriate for an auction context might be constructed.
Thus, standard methods for incorporating the supply side in a discrete choice framework are not applicable to our context. However, if we develop linear expressions for supply and demand, then we can estimate them simultaneously using established simultaneous equations methods. However, as we discuss below, we concluded that this approach is inferior to the separate estimation reported in the paper. Accordingly, we did not implement this method, although we describe it below.
To develop linear expressions for supply and demand, we began with a structural model of individual choice based on utility maximization and then aggregated over individuals to yield linear models akin to "gravity models" (e.g., Blum & Goldfarb, 2006; Hortacsu et al., 2009 ). We begin with the construction of the linear demand model.
Linear Demand Model
Let s = seller, b = buyer, m = vehicle model, i,j = facility, c = channel, and t = week. Each buyer b has a "local" facility i determined based on his zip code. Define the "grounding city" as the city in which a vehicle is located prior to its entering the market.
We do not observe the grounding city, but we assume that the probability that a vehicle is in a given grounding city is proportional to the size of the grounding city. E.g., a vehicle is more likely to be grounded in Dallas, TX than in Darlington, SC. Let Another consideration is that sellers have the option to sell or retain each auctioned vehicle (i.e., they can accept or reject the high bid). Thus, there are two seller behaviors at work in our context: a) where they choose to distribute vehicles, and b) whether they choose to sell the vehicles once they have distributed them. Section 4.2 directly models the first behavior. The linear supply equation above models some combination of both behaviors in that it accounts for how many vehicles sellers choose to sell at a facility k, with that number not to exceed the number of vehicles they had distributed there. We do not believe it possible to separate the two behaviors in this approach. Although both behaviors are relevant, the first behavior is more pertinent to the research question. This is because it is reasonable that sellers might systematically distribute vehicles in a way that affects geographic price variance (see the logic in Section 3.) It is less reasonable to expect that sellers systematically accept and reject high bids in a way that affects geographic price variance.
Given these issues, we determined that separate estimation was the most appropriate approach for our context. Also, any concern about a simultaneity bias in our estimation is mitigated by our use of daily data and the sequential nature of buyer/seller behavior: sellers choose where to distribute vehicles before buyers choose where to purchase vehicles. The sequential nature of the decisions allows us to include the relevant supply variables directly in the demand model and vice versa, and the daily data ensure that the sequence of behavior is not confounded by aggregating across multiple days.
